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ABSTRACT

This study examines the effects of political representation on economic inequality across
western industrialized democracies. I explore an explanation of increases in economic inequality
as a consequence of less representative democratic institutions. Explaining economic inequality
in this manner is a shift from to the Transatlantic Consensus that attributes increased economic
inequality to globalization. I expect to find that more representative electoral and governments
institutions will be associated with lower levels of economic inequality. The analysis takes place
across twenty-three countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) over the past forty years using a cross-sectional longitudinal model. Variables used to
operationalize the level of representation of democratic institutions include a novel variable of
the representative ratio, the effective number of parties, an index of institutional constraints,
presidential system, single member districts, and judicial review. Voter turnout, the percentage of
seats held by women, gross domestic product per capita, unemployment, and the size of the
industrial sector are used as control variables. The findings support the main hypothesis: as
political representation increases, economic inequality decreases.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Economic inequality varies within and across countries, regions, gender, ethnic groups
and age. Many contributing factors affect economic inequality, such as differences in the
productivity of labor versus capital (Piketty, 2014), the differences in wages and salaries (Gurría,
2011), levels of unemployment or underemployment (Gurría, 2011), progressive and regressive
tax policy (OECD, 2011), human capital investment through education (OECD, 2011), and other
variables; however, the impact of democratic institutions is understudied. The extent in which
representation in democratic institutions functions as a mediator for economic inequality in
developed countries is an important link in understanding recent increases in economic
inequality.
In this thesis, I use comparative representative institutions to analyze variations in
economic inequality across developed democracies. This thesis explores the link between
democratic institutions and economic inequality. I expect to find that there is evidence to support
that varying forms of democratic institutions are a contributing factor in developed states’
economic inequality.

Economic Inequality’s Importance
Importance and Consequences of Economic Inequalities
In the past decade, the issue of economic inequality has become more salient in national
and global discourse. Questions about economic inequality have been an important and relevant
issue from domestic debates about redistribution, a la the Tea Party and the Occupy Wall Street
1

Movement, to global concerns rooted in economic inequality, such as the “Arab Spring” and
European debt crises. The Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Secretary-General Angel Gurría (2011) notes that:
Sustained inequality inhibits growth and social cohesion…[we] observed [this] at the
beginning of the [global economic] crisis when the housing bubble burst, and the most
vulnerable couldn’t afford to pay for their mortgages anymore. The framework and the
incentives which made this happen had its roots in the deep-rooted social imbalances
[due to economic inequality]. (para. 7)
While these current events are complex and multidimensional, these stories all share
economic inequality as a common underlying factor. These examples illustrate that “[r]ising
income inequality creates economic, social and political challenges” and these challenges can
negatively impact individuals at all levels of society (OECD, 2011, p. 40).
The concept of economic inequality is a central focus in the social sciences. Economic
inequality is both a normative and positive concern of researchers and policy-makers in political
science, economics, and sociology. Rueda (2008) states that:
Inequality is frequently invoked as an explanation for a number of crucial issues...[i]t is
often considered a determinant of processes as diverse as the decline of electoral turnout,
the increase in the support of extreme-right parties, or the likelihood of political conflict.
(p. 169)
Many researchers illustrate that economic inequality and the effects on society are systemic and
negatively impact public attitudes, political environments, economic output, and social wellness
indicators (Alesina & Rodrik, 1994; Perotti, 1993; Persson & TaBellini, 1994; Rueda, 2008;
Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010).
Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) have expounded on the consequences caused by high
economic inequality. They find correlations and evidence that suggests that developed countries’
2

economic inequality has an effect on the level of trust of citizens, rates of mental illness, life
expectancy, infant mortality, obesity, educational performance, teenage births, homicides,
imprisonment rates, and overall social mobility. While the negative consequences from
economic inequality are often debated, the generally understood perspective on economic
inequality is that “[a]t an intuitive level people have always recognized that inequality is socially
corrosive” (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010, p. x).
High levels of economic inequality are a factor in a number of other research fields.
Negative consequences of high levels of economic inequality include reduced national economic
growth (Alesina & Rodrik, 1994; Perotti, 1993; Persson & Tabellini, 1994) and the reduction of
social capital and social well-being (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). As a tool for research, “[m]ost
analysts would agree that political factors influence inequality in significant ways. Because
inequality has political determinants and political consequences, it deserves to be a central
concern of comparative political economy” (Rueda, 2008, p. 170). I explore the philosophical
basis and contemporary research of economic inequality further in the thesis to draw on the
overall connection between inequality and representation.

Analyzing the Rise in Economic Inequality
Developed democratic countries do not share a definitive trend in economic inequality
(Atkinson, 1999; Brandolini & Smeeding, 2008). For instance, the OECD report Divided We
Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising finds that while the OECD countries’ group Gini coefficient
has increased ten percent in the past quarter century (from 0.29 to 0.316), income inequality for
each country has moved in different patterns (OECD, 2011, p. 22). This is contrary to the
3

established Transatlantic Consensus, where advocates argue that systemic trends in economic
inequality have been explained by economic shifts in exogenous factors resulting from
globalization (Atkinson, 1999). Based on this perspective, as developed economies shift away
from unskilled to skilled labor and economic rewards for skilled labor far exceeded those for
unskilled labor, economic inequality is then increased. However, the Transatlantic Consensus
does not adequately account for variations in economic inequality within a cross-national
perspective.
Contemporary explanations for fluctuations or stabilization in rates of economic
inequality must be based on a broader understanding of the contributing factors. A larger scope is
needed to understand the full parameters involved with increasing economic inequality instead of
a myopic economic explanation like the Transatlantic Consensus (Atkinson, 1999; Beramendi &
Anderson, 2008; Beramendi & Cusack, 2008). Many variables have an effect on economic
inequality and should be utilized to research changes in rates of economic inequality. One
important factor to consider is the structure of democratic institutions in national governments
when questioning the validity of the Transatlantic Consensus and the effects of globalization on
economic inequality. Democratic institutions and the relative size of representative bodies to the
national population is an underplayed factor in addressing contemporary economic inequality.

The United States Case Study: Representation Diluted
My motivation for studying economic inequality and democratic institutions is based on
the United States’ relatively high rate of economic inequality. Recent global economic inequality
rankings have the United States “...near the extreme end of the inequality scale” (Fischer, 2011,
4

para. 4). The United States’ economic inequality range is comparable to countries such as
Cameroon, Uganda and Ecuador (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013-14). In terms of developed
countries, the United States is ranked as one of the countries with the highest levels of economic
inequality (Fischer, 2011). Why is this?
At the national legislative level, compared to other developed countries, the United States
has the least number of representatives relative to its population. Each legislator in the United
States House of Representatives represents an average of approximately 709,759 people. This
compares to Germany (approximately 136,923 people per representative), Japan (approximately
265,750 people per representative), and at the lowest end of the spectrum Iceland’s
(approximately 5,067 people per representative). These figures compare to an average of
approximately 101,000 of the 23 OECD countries used in this study. On a purely quantitative
basis, the United States has very high economic inequality and has the least equitable ratio of
representatives to its population.
From a historical perspective, at its founding the United States House of Representative
was established with a ratio of around 30,000 individuals per representative. Eventually this
number climbed to 212,019 in 1911 when Congress fixed its total members to 435 legislators.
Since that time, the voting franchise has been extended to women, racial minorities and to those
aged 18 year old or older, thus a broadening of the voter base. At its current ratio of 709,759
people per representative, one can conclude that an individual’s share of a representation as a
public good has declined by a drastic amount in the past century.
In 2001, U.S. Representative Alcee Hastings wrote a “Dear Colleague” letter concerning
the drastic difference in relative number of the seats in the House of Representatives compared to
5

many other national legislatures. Hastings urged Congress to create a commission to study this
issue further. He states that the impact of increasing the number of representatives “is obvious”
and that there would be “reduced amount of campaign spending, smaller Congressional districts,
more personal interactions between Members of Congress and their constituents, and most
importantly, better representation for the American people” (Hastings, 2001, para. 3). Studying
economic inequality and democratic representation within an institutional framework heeds
Representative Hastings’ H.R. 506 for the research of legislative size, representation, and its
potential effects.

Purpose of Research
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze increases in economic inequality due to impact of
democratic institutions as national populations increase and legislature sizes stagnate. This
research will help to explain why the Transatlantic Consensus is limited in its explanation of
increased economic inequality. While exogenous economic factors related to globalization are
part of the puzzle of economic inequality, the mediating role of government must be included to
fully understand the issue.
Higher rates of economic inequality, due to globalization, should cause lower income
individuals (the “losers”) to demand redistributionary policies or institutions and regulations
from their democratically elected representatives. However, with less representative institutions,
individuals that have economic and political means (the “winners” from globalization) will
capture the interests of political institutions over those without similar access. The loss of
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representative institutions will further fuel economic inequality and the wealth dispersion
experienced because of globalization.

Summary of Thesis
In Chapter 2, I review the literature on the philosophical arguments and empirical
research on economic inequality. Economic inequality “...is political and institutional not only in
its origins but also in its consequences” and the literature review illustrates how it must be
understood as both a factor and a product, exogenous and endogenous, to a political economic
structure (Beramendi & Anderson, 2008, p. 5). The study explores the links between economic
inequality and the political-social structure of representative democracies.
After reviewing the relevant literature on the subject of economic inequality and
democratic representation, Chapter 3 discusses methodology and the current and alternate
methods of approaching economic inequality are reviewed to contrast against the methods used
in this thesis. The quantitative model uses cross-national and longitudinal variables that have an
impact on economic inequality. The data is from 23 OECD countries over a period from 1970 to
2009. In the methodology section, the variable selection is reviewed and the model is
constructed. The hypothesis of the study is that there will be a negative relationship between the
level of representation of democratic institutions and economic inequality.
In Chapter 4, the results of the quantitative analysis will be reported and discussed. The
results are evaluated within the context of the original hypothesis and the expectations set by the
literature review.
7

Chapter 5 concludes the study within the larger scope of the results. I discuss the study’s
contribution and highlight the broader implications of this research. The limitations of the
research are expounded upon, both in regard to this thesis, the topic of economic inequality, and
representative democratic institutions. Finally, avenues for future research are elaborated on
including the use of other variables, populations, and methodologies.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction to the Literature
The literature on economic inequality and the connection to democracy is wide and
varied. For the purpose of this thesis, the literature review focuses first on the philosophical and
historical context of economic inequality; next, on the philosophical basis of democratic
governance and representation; and last in the institutional mechanisms, interplay, and factors
that connect economic inequality and democratic representation. The literature review will set
the foundation in understanding the link between economic inequality and democratic
representation.

Equality and Inequality
Philosophical and Historical Perspective
Economic inequality has been a subject of concern since the beginning of civilization
(Freund, 1979; Gosepath, 2011). Consideration for the ‘haves' and the ‘have nots’ have always
been a topic debated between philosophers, leaders, advocates for the poor and in general
discourse for many generations. Concerns about economic inequality have ranged from moral
arguments and normative assessments to practical policy and measures to prevent social
disruption. For instance, Plato warns about the importance of balancing economic inequality in
society:
In a state which is desirous of being saved from the greatest of all plagues-not faction, but
rather distraction-there should exist among the citizens neither extreme poverty nor,
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again, excessive wealth, for both are productive of great evil...Now the legislator should
determine what is to be the limit of poverty or of wealth. (2008, section 5, para. 18)
Equality, in the theoretical sense, is multifaceted. Outside of the economic dimension,
equality as a concept is functional with regard to civil liberties, political participation, and social
positions (Gosepath, 2011). While defining equality, the exact meaning follows normative
notions of justice, various minimum threshold requirements, an overall extension of equality and
what is ultimately the benefit from working towards the ideal of equality (Freund, 1979).
Understanding the broader concept of equality allows for the expansion of its application in an
economic scope.
Concerns with regard to equality have existed from the beginning of civilization. The
basis for advocating for various forms of equality in society is rooted in the study of justice. It is
used as a context for understanding equality and is phrased as the “principle of equality” where
equality “…through its connection with justice…has different justitanda, i.e., objects the term
‘just’ or ‘equal’ or their opposites can be applied to” (Gosepath, 2011, section 2, para. 2).
Essentially, when “…choosing for comparison the appropriate grouping—whether the
appropriate unit is the individual or some category of individuals…” one must understand the
overall “…appropriateness—the relevance and representativeness—of classifications” (Freund,
1979, p. 18). The first concern when attempting to find if objects or concepts are equal or
balanced is to assess if a valid comparison is being made. This concern can be summed up as the
common idiom of whether one is comparing ‘apples to oranges’.
The principle of equality is categorized into additional concepts to further explain how
justice relates to equality. At the most basic level of equality is formal equality which is to “treat
10

like cases as like” (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E., book 5, section 3, para. 1). Formal equality can only be
considered based the subjective standpoint of what equal cases might be. For instance, if a lord
and a pauper come before the law as ‘equal citizens’, how might the two be considered a-like
when it is evident that they are not objectively implicit equals in a society?
Questions of comparing “apples to oranges” in the context of formal equality leads one to
consider the next form of equality, proportional equality. Proportional equality “…further
specifies formal equality; it is more precise and detailed, hence actually the more comprehensive
formulation of formal equality” (Gosepath, 2011, section 2.2, para. 1). Proportional equality is
the consideration of unequal status and applying this consideration to the judgments of equality.
Based on the previous example, according to proportional equality a lord would be held to a
higher status compared to a pauper. The two may never be considered on the same level of
justice due to the unequal status between the two categories. Proportional equality is limited
because it does not explicitly weigh the unequal status. Egalitarians, individuals who advocate
equality for all, believe that both formal and proportional equality are the foundation for justice,
however, through moral equality, justice through equality is further expanded through a
normative position.
From the time of Plato and Aristotle up until the Age of Enlightenment, concerns of
justice and equality were not universal as they are today. Instead, the franchise of citizenship,
suffrage, and other constructions of rights and privilege were restricted by society and by law.
Individuals were not considered to be equals and “…it was assumed that human beings are
unequal by nature” (Gosepath, 2011, Section 2.3, paragraph 1). Early classical liberal
philosophers laid the foundation for claims of universal human justice and equality with the
11

evolution of natural rights. This evolution in Western philosophy developed a narrative in the
moral claim for the expansion of civil rights for labor, minorities, women, immigrants, etc. The
previous understanding of a natural order between the heavens and beasts was overtaken by a
leveled field of universality of human rights developed by the works of Hobbes, Locke,
Rousseau and other political philosophers. With this basis Kymlicka finds that “…moral equality
constitutes the ‘egalitarian plateau’ for all contemporary political theories” (Gosepath, 2011,
section 2.3, para. 2).
Normative claims for universal justice and equality became the standard of a civil society
due to moral equality in the development of natural rights. However, the justitanda becomes a
new concern. While contemporary philosophers agree that universal justice through equality is
the moral position, one must then consider ‘equality of what’. If one is to consider that society
has a presumption of equality then there is the requirement that “…everyone, regardless of
differences, should get an equal share in the distribution…” of all politically distributable goods
(Gosepath, 2011).
These political distributable goods are identified as civil rights that exist in the legal
sphere, opportunities for political participation which exist in the political sphere, social
positions and opportunities which exists in the social sphere, and economic rewards that exist in
the economic sphere. Both the legal sphere and political sphere has been developed within
Western democracies with the ending of slavery and the full emancipation of former slaves as
well as the expansion of suffrage and property rights to women and all minorities. However,
there are still issues with qualifying full equality for civil rights (immigration and enemy
combatants) and political participation (electoral reform and voter disenfranchisement).
12

Both the social and economic spheres of politically distributable goods are modern areas
that are still developing as areas for the expansion of moral equality. The social sphere of
equality is a normative position where social positions and opportunities in society are to be
considered based on an equal positioning with unbiased influence. While it can be agreed that
individuals should be awarded positions based on qualifications and performance, the question
then becomes to what extent should something be done to correct instances where this does not
occur, whether due to structural or individual discrimination.
In contrast to equality of opportunity, equality of outcomes is the maintaining of equal
economic conditions for individuals in society. The need for equality of outcomes should not be
necessary when equality of opportunity has been fully established. This is because when equality
of opportunity is present “…individuals [then] have responsibility for their decisions…” and the
overall outcome of those decisions (Gosepath, 2011, section 3.1, para. 7). Even within the
perspective of egalitarians, individuals still have a moral responsibility to make the correct
decisions and choices when equality of opportunity is prevalent (Gosepath, 2011).
The economic sphere, with regard to the presumption of equality of public political
distribution, is the major theoretical departure for this research. For both the social and economic
sphere, one must ask:
[W]hether, and to what extent, the state should establish far-reaching equality of social
conditions for all through political measures such as redistribution of income and
property, tax reform, a more equal education system, social insurance, and positive
discrimination. (Gosepath, 2011, section 2.4, para. 10)
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If the attempt is to find some semblance of justice through equality, to what extent is economic
equality then justified? Governments and policy makers have the tools and abilities to affect the
level of economic equality, but when is it justified to do so?
Most contemporary liberals advocate some level of justified economic distribution. The
opposing perspectives against a moderate position on the economic sphere of the presumption of
equality are those of librarians and socialists. Freund (1979) refers to this divergence from
moderate economic distribution:
Philosophers of the free market…who would limit equality to formal neutral rules for the
market and the law, see in the enforced equality of opportunity a doctrinal device to
justify more tinkering and control, more coercion and distortion..[o]n the other hand,
democratic socialists...have seen in the principle of equality of opportunity an attempt to
evade the responsibility of moral decision regarding ultimate equality and inequality.
(p. 22-23)
Both perspectives represent the two extremes against the presumption of equality in the
economic sphere. Both the orthodox libertarian and socialists have limitations in their arguments
against the contemporary liberals views on economic equality.
Advocates of economic equality through distributive means would argue that the
libertarian perspective of freedom from distributive equality is not good enough, or does
anything at all, to achieve justice through equality. A major point of contention for these
advocates is that Nozick’s (1974) interpretation of the “Lockean Proviso” is limited (Gosepath,
2011; Kymlicka, 1990).
Locke advocated the ideals of the natural right for all humans to achieve freedom through
self-ownership and many libertarians use his The Second Treatise of Civil Government (1690) as
the foundational understanding of natural rights with regard to classical liberalism. The
14

“Lockean Proviso” puts forth that acquisitions of private property (more specifically land) is just
so long as “…at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others” (Locke,
1690, Chapter 5, Section 27). However, qualifying and interpreting what might be “enough” or
as “good” is problematic. According to Nozick’s interpretation of the “Lockean Proviso,” so
long as the initial acquisition of property does not have a negative effect on those already bound
to the property, then it meets Locke’s overall requirement (Nozick, 1974).
In response to Nozick’s understanding of Locke, Kymlicka argues that the libertarian
version of Locke is conflicting due to its limitations in fully realizing what occurs with regard to
those affected (1990). To say “…where there is enough…” of resources or left “…as good…” as
the previous condition of resources does not explain the after-effects of the material well-being
of the commons. Nozick’s understanding does not take into consideration the pre-appropriation
conditions of private property acquisition. When the commons are subject to solely the will of
individuals claim ownership, the resources become restricted from others to benefit from their
potential labor of said resource. Furthermore, other conditions based on the pre-acquisition of
resources are important to consider when attempting to compare the period before and after the
resources are put into private ownership. Locke assumes that resources in the state of nature exist
as un-owned though a counter-argument can be made that the commons are already the owner of
resource endowments from the beginning (Kymlicka, 1990).
From the opposite perspective, the most orthodox socialist or communist, the ideal of full
social and economic equality, that of simple equality, “…is generally rejected as untenable”
(Gosepath, 2011, Section 3.1, para. 1). To apply full social and economic equality through law
would be immoral, unsustainable, and unnatural. Simple equality and the full enforcement of
15

equality of outcomes is an unrealistic ideal based on objections developed by contemporary
liberals, modern libertarians, socialists, and Marxists (Gosepath, 2011). Instead, egalitarians,
socialists, and Marxists generally seek a more complex equality over that of simple equality.

Levels of Economic Inequality
Economic inequality in Western developed nations have been a large subject of study for
academics, policy-makers, think tanks, and global institutions. While rates of economic
inequality have increased as a group, individual countries’ rates and trends have not (OECD,
2011). When exploring the factors explaining economic inequality, it is found that “any theory
must account for the basic fact that inequality levels and trends vary widely both across
democratic countries and within each country” (Brandolini & Smeeding, 2008, p. 26).
Furthermore, differences in economic inequality over time and across nations are dependent on a
large number of factors that impact inequality. A singular reasoning or unified economic
explanation, such as the Transatlantic Consensus, is misguided when attempting to explain
assumed trends or variations in economic inequality (Atkinson, 1999).
From a historical perspective, Brandolini and Smeeding find that a selected group of
Western developed democracies experienced a large drop in inequality during and immediately
after World War II. A slow increase in inequality during the post-war period then led to an
eventual climb in the 1970s, which has continued until today. These specific trends have not
been consistent nor are universal throughout all the industrialized democracies. According to
Brandolini and Smeeding (2008):
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Changes in inequality do not exhibit clear trajectories but rather irregular movements...
[t]ogether with the lack of a common international pattern, this suggests that we should
look at explanations based on the joint working of multiple factors. (p. 53)
Their analysis argues against the previously established trend of the Transatlantic Consensus
where, due to economic shifts in labor and capital values because of globalization, industrialized
democratic countries were thought to share a general trend in economic inequality.
Brandolini and Smeedings’ analysis concludes that in the past 40 years, there is no
universal story for economic inequality rates in industrialized democracies. Furthermore, they
find that the state-specific changes to public monetary redistribution are an important
determinant in establishing patterns with rates of economic inequality. Lastly, Brandolini and
Smeedings’ research illustrates that there are currently clusters in grouping of rates of inequality
generally related to geographic and/or cultural similarities. Brandolini and Smeeding (2008) state
that:
Mexico and Russia have the most unequal distributions, followed by English-speaking
countries intertwined with Southern European countries, other continental European
nations comes next, and the Nordic countries show the lowest level of inequality; most
Eastern European countries show low to medium levels of inequality, while Taiwan and
Japan are in an intermediate position. (p. 51)
A lack of universal trend for industrialized democratic countries is evident; however, geographic
and/or cultural clustering may help in understanding relative differences in economic inequality
movement.

17

Democratic Representation and Economic Inequality
Democratic Representation is understood as two parts of a single concept. First is that of
representation theory and how an individual has the ability to represent a population in
government. And next is democracy as a means for linking governmental institutions and
citizenry. While the two concepts are often considered as a natural pair, philosophically they are
two distinct ideas. I use an institutional approach in which representation and democracy are
viewed as one concept.

Representation
Pitkin goes to great lengths to fully understand the concept of representation while
illustrating the key philosophical differences in various definitions of representation (1967). She
starts with a basic definition of representation as being “...a making present again” something
which already exists or existed (Pitkin, 1967, p.8). Individuals in society have personal interests,
priorities, and concerns that a representative has the responsibility to relate in government.
Representatives stand in for constituents to express their political agendas and policy
preferences. For the purposes of this thesis, representation, based on Pitkin’s definition, is the
‘making present again’ societal demands of mediating economic inequality.
Pitkin explains representation in four different conceptualizations of representation as it
applies to politics and government: formalistic representation, symbolic representation,
descriptive representation and substantive representation. She describes these four definitions of
representation as having distinct differences with varying applications. Each orientation on
representation is debated as to its requirements in forming an affirmative meaning of political
18

representation. Instead, of considering each as a separate form of valid political representation,
the four together form a complete understanding of representation for the purposes of this thesis.
The first conceptual explanation of representation is that of formalistic representation.
Pitkin describes formalistic representation as being the institutional arrangements that exist or
existed to allow government to represent a population. Whether through conquest, hereditary
lineage, divine right, or electoral agreements, the formalistic version of representation is the
accepted right to govern and represent a population. Pitkin’s formalistic representation is
supported by authorization theorists and accountability theorists where:
[T]he one group defines a representative as someone who has been elected (authorized),
the other defines him as someone who will be subject to election (held to account).
Where the one sees representation as initiated in a certain way, the other sees it as
terminated in a certain way. (1967, p. 58)
Pitkin points to how the formalistic definition of representation is limited because it only focuses
on the right to represent through being given legitimacy, even if not actually representative in the
modern sense. Formalistic representation does not go far enough to explain the broader
conceptualization representation.
The view of symbolic representation is more abstract as it relates to this thesis. Symbolic
representation is how a representative “stands for” a represented population. This understanding
of representation, as it applies to political science and government, can be exemplified (as Pitkin
does) as a revolutionary assembly. In this instance Pitkin (1967) finds that:
[R]epresenting is not acting with authority, or acting before being held to account...
[r]ather, it depends on the representative’s characteristics, on what he is or is like, on
being something rather than doing something...he ‘stands for’ [the represented].
(p. 61)
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This can be interpreted to mean that symbolic forms of representation have shortcomings due to
the subjective nature of representative meaning. On a practical policy and outcomes basis,
symbolic representation will only be effective so long as the meaning lasts. Revolutionary
assemblies may only last for the period of revolution when they are found to be representatively
meaningful. The differences in voting for a party on the left or right can be considered symbolic
representation as it relates to economic inequality where the former may “stand for” increased
redistribution of wealth and government regulation compared to the latter.
The final two forms of representation that Pitkin defines are descriptive representation
and substantive representation. Descriptive representation is the way the representative compares
to whom they are representing. For identity and minority politics, this is the literal way the
representative’s demographics compare to their constituents. This includes economic and social
background, age, education level, race, and other demographic factors. It is assumed that
constituents will feel and be more represented when their representatives are of similar
backgrounds. Meeting the qualifications of descriptive representation will not guarantee that
those of similar backgrounds will act to fully represent those constituents with common
demographics. This leads to Pitkin’s final conceptualization of representation.
Substantive representation is measured by the actual actions of the representative for
whom they are representing. The measure of substantive representation is through the
endorsement or voting for particular policies and advocating certain agendas for their
constituencies. When a representative crafts policy, votes for certain legislation, and supports
particular priorities which benefit whom they represent, then this is what it means to be
substantively representative of their population.
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With Pikin’s four definitions of political representation, one can apply a framework to
analyze a government’s representation through institutions and efficacy. Whether framed
conceptually by formal, symbolic, descriptive or substantive representation, Pitkin develops a
structured understanding of representation as it applies to politics and government. Pitkin’s
requirements of representation, though not implicitly applied to a democratic mechanism, have a
direct connection with democratic governance.

Democracy
Democracy finds its strength and support, as an institution and a means for governance,
in the legitimacy constructed by participatory government (Fukuyama, 1992). The perception of
legitimacy is created by the ability for individuals to participate in governmental processes and
express their opinions. Individuals find greater legitimacy and have an impactful voice in
governing society through participatory government and voting. However, absolute democracy,
where individuals are required to participate on all government decisions, is limited in its
realistic implementation. This is due to the requirement to have people constantly participate in
self-governing bodies on a day-to-day basis. Forms of representative democracy are used as the
realistic alternative since the idealized form of democracy is not feasible in modern society.
The discussion of democracy and representation, as it applies to modern government,
should include an understanding of perspectives on freedom. Freedom, as defined by Berlin, is
separated into two different concepts. One form is a negative freedom, meaning freedom from
being coerced or interfered with by government. This is freedom, in the classical liberal sense,
where government ought be limited and restrained as to maximize individual freedom. The other
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form is as a positive freedom, which allows “...individual to be his own master” (Berlin, 1969).
Positive freedom is the ability for individuals to pursue their potential so long as they have the
ability and resources to do so. The guarantee of varying degrees of both negative and positive
freedom by government is generally understood as a basic right. This perspective on freedom is
the contemporary standard of liberal democratic governance.
The model of liberal democratic governance is championed as the pinnacle of human
social-political development. The implications of this form of governance is cited and illustrated
by Fukuyama (1992). Fukuyama argues that humanity has reached a Hegelian-“End of History”
due to the continued proliferation globally of liberal democratic governments. Both the ideals of
political freedom and self-sustaining legitimacy of representative government is inherent to
liberal democratic systems and it has and continues to follow humanities’ long socialevolutionary climb to achieving this form of governance (Fukuyama, 1992).
The overall effect of liberal democracies, it is argued, has led to a continued increase in
prosperity and a decrease in violent conflict both domestically and internationally (Fukuyama,
1992). Liberal democracies have increased the ability for individuals to achieve an ethical life
with limited government coercion that is not possible for the majority of society under
dictatorships, monarchies or totalitarian rule. While arguments can be made as to the different
standards for what constitute a “liberal democratic regime” it remains that liberal democratic
forms of government, however defined, have had positive affects compared to past forms of
societal organization.
The mechanism of the democratic process, in a legitimate government, has the ability to
fulfill the desires of a population. French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau was one of the
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most prominent thinkers who dealt with issues of legitimacy in a society with regards to
democratic governance. While generally advocating for smaller, less interdependent and more
egalitarian societies, he also looked to identify a conception of societal direction that he termed
the General Will. In Of the Social Contract (1762), Rousseau considered that when men come
together and “consider themselves a single body, they have but one will, which is concerned with
their common preservation and the general welfare” (Rousseau, 1988, p. 148). Rousseau
explained that societies of men would find a realization of the General Will through the
sovereign, or government, of a nation. The interplay between the two would be a fulfillment of
needed democratic legitimacy in a society.
A main concern that Rousseau expressed is that as a society grew and became larger
“…the social bond is stretched, the more slack it grows” (Rousseau, 1988, p. 112). Eventually, as
these social bonds in a society become further stretched and worn down, like that of a used
rubber band, then there will be negative effects on the General Will and the legitimacy of a
sovereign government. Rousseau warns that this creates the potential that “[n]ot only is the
government less vigorous and swift in enforcing the laws...but the people [have] less affection
for leaders whom it never sees, for its homeland...and for its fellow citizens” (Rousseau, 1988, p.
112). While Rousseau may have been inferring this reality from the history of expansive empires
and pre-Westphalian kingdoms, there are still real implications that this can has for governments
and the perspective of their rule as legitimate. He warns that the growing slack in a society will
eventually conclude to “...a body too large for its constitution [which] collapses and perishes,
crushed under its own weight” (Rousseau, 1988, p. 113).
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Rousseau develops a relevant thought experiment that illustrates what growth does to a
state when the growth is not accounted for in governmental institutions. He imagines a state that
has 10,000 citizens and only one overall sovereign or government. In this situation, each
individual has a ten-thousandth (1/10,000) share in the government. He then asks what happens
when the population of citizens changes from 10,000 to 100,000 individuals. Of course a dilution
in the share of individuals slice of government would occur decreasing the absolute size but
maintaining equal relative size of shares. Though their change is from ten-thousandth a share to
one-hundred-thousandth (1/100,000), the overall responsibility for citizens to the laws and their
subjection to the sovereign will remain the same. Rousseau (1988) continues by stating:
[S]ince the subject always remains a single individual, the ratio between the sovereign
and the subject increases with the number of citizens. Whence it follows that the more the
state expands, the more liberty is diminished. (p.120)

Institutional Representation and Economic Inequality
In this study I consider the link between economic inequality and the level of
representation of democratic institutions. The relationship between economic inequality and
political structure can form an echo-chamber in which “...inequality affects democratic political
processes...broadly and fundamentally, including the choice of political regime, the selection of
fiscal structures, parties’ mobilization strategies, and the decision to turn out to vote” (Beramendi
& Anderson, 2008, p. 5). At the core of the democratic process is the link between the population
and their government. The link can exist in many forms, including rallies, petitions and opinion
polls. The most formal of these connections between citizens and government is through their
elected representatives. National governments are mediators of economic inequality and
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international trade and if they do not perform this role, economic inequality will become even
more destabilizing to a society and economy.
Within a historical context, economic and social inequality has a recorded relationship
with institutional structures ever since the Greek democracies. What Rogowski and MacRae
explore is the nature of this relationship between inequality and institutions. More specifically,
they note that the two concepts have moved together throughout history but they attempt to
isolate whether one leads to the transformation of the other (2008).
The traditional stance in political science and economic studies is that institutions affect
inequality while new research has challenged this assumption (Beramendi and Anderson, 2008;
Rogowski and MacRae, 2008). Rogowski and MacRae find that there is a “causal sequence” that
illustrates “that both [in]equality and institutions are affected by exogenous social change,
usually occasioned by innovations in technology, trade, demographics, or some combination of
these three” (2008). In their perspective, first there is the exogenous social change is followed by
a change in inequality. This change quickly leads to a change in institutions and ultimately there
is a further change in inequality.
Regardless of the actual causality of events between inequality and institutions,
Rogowski and MacRae (2008) support their sequence by analyzing change through a
mathematical and historical scope. In the mathematical models of change, shifts are noted to
generally occur when the income of the median voter becomes less than that of the average voter
whether due to exogenous shifts (because of technology, trade, and/or demographics) and
impactful welfare losses (because of inadequate democratic institutions) (Rogowski & MacRae,
2008).
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Through the historical model, Rogowski and MacRae focus on the shift that have
occurred in Western History focusing on the exogenous social changes that occur due to
technology, trade, and demographics throughout the centuries. The overall evolution starts with
the early forms of change with the military technology and trade of the Ancient Greeks and
Roman Republic, the advent of sustained European Feudalism, the demographic shifts due to
Black Death, the societal changes due to the technology changes resulting in the Protestant
Reformation, the rise of Monarchical Absolutism, the shift towards the Democratic Revolution,
the mass mobilization of the World Wars and the final shift towards Universal Franchise
Expansion (2008, p. 357). From this overview Rogowski and MacRae (2008) establish two
major points:
First, equality of endowments usually changes with, or even before, changes occur in
political institutions in the standard historical accounts. And second, the main exogenous
sources of change in inequality and institutions have been changes in military technology,
trade, migration, disease, and information technology. (p. 369)
Within their final interpretation they infer that historians are right to focus on these
broader shifts where inequality brings forth institutional shifts. However, “the view that
‘institutions determine inequality’ is right for the shorter and more realistic term” that is
traditionally used by social scientists in exploring inequality and institutions (Rogowski &
MacRae, 2008, p. 369). They note that emerging research has been challenging the notion that
“institutions determine inequality”. The compromise for Rogowski and MacRae is that for
democratic transitions and sustainability, there is an inverse-U relationship. On one side is a
society, which is economically equal with no incentive to change institutions; the other is a
society that is extremely economically unequal with no ability to change institutions.
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Institutional Factors
After considering the foundations and developments of economic inequality and
democratic representation, one can begin to understand the factors that link the two. Through an
institutional perspective, government has an impact on economic inequality through the ability to
redistribute resources, implement regulations and create new institutions (Smeeding, 2004). The
following section is an account of what has already been examined regarding the link between
economic inequality and democratic representation.
Beramendi and Anderson (2008) compile several studies that explore the connection
between inequality and representation. They acknowledge that the question of inequality in
society has historical origins to the time of Plato and is now widely pervasive in contemporary
academic research. They make the case that differences in inequality “...are political and
institutional---that is, that they are the product of the democratic political process and of how
political institutions work to produce economic outcomes” (Beramendi & Anderson, 2008, p. 4).
They argue that the Downsian perspective of the competitive median voter, the oldest and
best known framework, is too limited in its approach because “the model oversimplifies...the
politics of redistribution” (Beramendi & Anderson, 2008, p. 6). They argue that using the
Downsian perspective to analyze redistributory politics, the key connection between government
policy and economic inequality, incorrectly “reduces redistribution to a single dimension,
which...allows for single-peaked preferences” for the classic median voter (Beramendi &
Anderson, 2008, p. 6). Thus, Beramendi and Anderson point to the need to analyze inequality
within a theoretical approach that takes into account institutional factors.
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An institutional based approach is the framework used to analyze the effects of varying
levels of representation on a democratic society. “Political struggles are mediated by the
institutional setting…” of a country and that changing the amount of representation in a system
may “affect the nature of...how politics is conducted” (Ware, 1996, p. 9). While the effect that
occurs when changing the level of representation is the focus of this research the responsiveness
of the system needs to be analyzed. Implementing a delay in the dependent variable of economic
inequality is one way in which to accomplish this challenge (as used in this paper’s research
design).
Democratic governance and economic inequality are linked to each other. The
relationship has been described by Beramendi and Anderson as an “echo-chamber”; however, it
is important for researchers to decouple this relationship (2008). In regard to redistributionary
policy, “there is broad agreement that the explanation [of varying economic inequality]...lies in
the design of political institutions and partisan responses to inequality” (Iversen & Soskice,
2008, p. 93). Furthermore, it is found that countries that are more egalitarian redistribute more
than countries that are less egalitarian and thus egalitarian countries have lower rates of
economic inequality because of redistribution (Iversen & Soskice, 2008). The varying
redistribution patterns support a research design that defines economic inequality as a dependent
variable of political institutions. The impact of government on economic inequality is a more
salient approach compared to arguments stating that economic inequality impacts and forms
representative and/or democratic political institutions.
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Electoral Structure and Institutions
Iversen and Soskice use the scope of electoral institutions to illustrate how parties and
income/wealth classes develop and create coalitions. These coalitions, on a cross-national basis,
tend to be dependent on the structure of the democratic electoral process. Iversen and Soskice
found that based on their survey of 17 advanced democracies from 1945 to 1998, “three-quarters
of governments in majoritarian systems were center-right, while three-quarters of governments
under proportional representation were center-left” (2008, p. 94). What this illustrates is that the
structure of electoral systems can impact the outcomes of partisan composition. This is important
to note because it demonstrates the connection between the institutional perspective and
redistributive policy.
According to Iversen and Soskice, “…the electoral formula affects coalition behavior and
leads to systematic differences in the partisan composition of governments--hence to different
distributive outcomes” (2008, p. 94-95). It is generally accepted and understood, in regard to
distribution, that “center-left government always redistributes more than center-right
governments” whether in the scope of redistribution to the poor or in the reduction of measures
of inequality through other policy (Iversen & Soskice, 2008, p. 101). Acknowledging this point
is then further compounded by the findings that:
[I]n a two-party majoritarian system the center-right party is more likely to win
government power, and redistribute less, than would be true in a multiparty PR system,
where the center party is more likely to ally with parties to its left. (Iversen and Soskice,
2008, p. 95)
Iversen and Soskice’s findings support their argument that the institutional structure of
democracies (whether two-party majoritarian or multiparty PR) has an effect on coalition
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building largely for the middle class. Ultimately, two-party majoritarian systems will be centerright governments that redistribute less than multiparty PR systems that produce center-left
governments that redistribute more. This research illustrates the reality of redistributive politics
and the institutional outputs of electoral formulas.
In the fiscal commons theory, government spending will benefit narrow segments of the
population but at the same time taxation is broadly distributed to a larger base (Buchanan &
Tullock, 1962; Gilligan & Matsusaka, 2001). Creating policy, more specifically redistributive
policy, is affected as legislative size increase. When the ratio of representatives to the population
increases the cost of collective decision making for legislative bodies is lowered (Buchanan &
Tullock, 1962; Gilligan & Matsusaka, 1999). Lowered costs for collective decision making
should lead to more incentives to pass policy compared to the opposite.
Gilligan and Matsusaka find evidence to support that a larger legislature has a positive
and statistically significant effect on United States’ state and local expenditures and revenues
(2001). They find that the larger legislatures spend more on education and highways compared to
smaller legislature sizes. The study also finds that the amount of seats in upper houses has a
larger effect for fiscal policy due possibly to inter-house bargaining (2001). Higher government
spending is a distribution of wealth that generally lessens rates of economic inequality. Based on
Gilligan and Matsusaka’s research, larger legislative size suggests higher levels of public
spending and lessened economic inequality.
The number of seats in the legislature has been found to have an effect on district
gerrymandering and partisan bias. When there is a greater number of seats and districts, the
ability to cut up pieces of districts through gerrymandering becomes easier (Gilligan &
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Matsusaka, 2001). Gilligan and Matsusaka define partisan bias as the variance between the
popular vote to the number of seats obtained in the legislature (1999).
They find that when the voting population increases without a change of total number of
seats in a legislature through additional districts then partisan bias increases. When the number
of seats increases and the voting population stays constant then partisan bias decreases.
However, if both the voting population and number of seats increase proportionally then partisan
bias decreases. Ultimately their study finds that “…partisan bias across unrelated political
jurisdictions (e.g., states) is systematically and directly related to the size of the voting
population…” (Gilligan & Matsusaka, 1999, p. 67).
Partisan bias will negatively impact economic inequality when center-left parties are in
control but this is not true when center-right parties are the majority. Partisan bias and
gerrymandering are largely a problem of majoritarian systems that are more likely to elect
center-right governments compared to proportional representation (Iversen & Soskice, 2008).
Majoritarian systems with partisan bias will lead to center-right legislatures who will redistribute
less and allow for higher levels of economic inequality.

Institutional Constraints
In analyzing the relationship between inequality and politics, Rueda explores how
political agency is affected within possible institutional constraints when it comes to creating
policy and affecting wage inequality (2008). He acknowledges that corporatist governmental
arrangements can affect left-governments’ ability to alter wages and thus corporatism constrains
overall political agency. This leads to limiting the ability for left-governments to craft policy that
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can effectively impact inequality. He argues that the relationship between corporatist structures
and left governments is “…complementary: when institutions cannot provide enough equality,
left governments pick up the slack” (Rueda, 2008, p. 189). This means that when the corporatist
structure is unable to address inequality, left governments are still able to effect change. This
also means that as there is a “decline of some institutional factors...[there can] be an opportunity
for political agency to become more influential” (Rueda, 2008, p. 190).

Executive and Judicial Institutions
Unlike the legislative branches of national governments, “…executive and judiciary
branches are purely state institutions [while] the national legislature is specifically designed to
link state and society” (Kroenig & Karan-Delhaye, 2011, p. 3). While executives and judiciary
branches exist in many countries, their level of power and amount of constitutional authority
varies. The literature debates the effect that executives and judiciaries have on representation and
democracy. However, the ability of each branch to restrain each other is important to consider
when establishing the overall impact that the institutions have on each other.
The executive branch has been considered to be closer to the median voter compared to
the legislature in cases of extreme gerrymandering (Matsusaka, 2007). While legislative
branches can suffer from partisan bias, as previously discussed, the executive branch is generally
reflected as a closer reflection of the general population. Depending on the constitutional powers
of the executive branch (veto power, policy crafting, administrational abilities), it can serve the
role of a representative check to the legislature.
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While framing the executive as more reflective of the electorate and a check against the
legislative branch, it also has potential of being too powerful without a proper counterbalance.
Generally defining the difference as it is applied to power, Kroenig and Karan-Delbaye state that
“national legislatures…are the principle institutions structured to disperse political power to a
broad segment of society and…constrain executive authority” which tends to be more narrow
(2011, p. 3).
An executive that is elected and then unrestrained can become too unpredictable, too
solitary, and largely insular in their policy. It is noted as an example that “countries with political
institutions that constrain executive power can provide more credible commitments to economic
actors in society that good economic institutions, where they exist, will remain in place,”
meaning that constraining executive power can help to stabilize political and economic
institutions within a society (Kroenig & Karan-Delhaye, 2011, p. 2). The literature illustrates that
the executive branch as an institution can be more representative of an electorate is also narrower
in its focus and application of power.
Judicial review is an institution that allows judges to interpret the constitutionality of
laws passed by legislative bodies and rule on the outcome of the legislative process. The concern
with judicial review is in the legitimacy puzzle where it is argued that judicial review can be
anti-democratic, unrepresentative, and illegitimate (Kyritsis, 2006). The democratic objection to
judicial review is that when accepting the ability of judges to review and rule on constitutionality
of laws it can come at a cost to the democratic process and ultimately have a negative impact on
the legitimacy of a countries’ legal structure (Kyritsis, 2006). While supporters of judicial review
argue that judicial review has the ability to enhance democracy and defend constitutional rights
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(like the United States’ Warren Court from 1953 to 1969), others find that the potential negative
impacts from judicial review can be detrimental for the democratic process (Waldron, 1999).
Judicial review is as a check against the ability of the majority to tyrannize the rights of the
minority in a democracy by defending and supporting a countries’ preexisting constitution.
Waldron argues for on the democratic objection to judicial review and concludes that
legislative supremacy is the legitimate form of democratic decision-making. Waldron (1999)
argues that:
[M]ost judges whose interpretations will be influential in the legal system [are not
elected]. Moreover, those judges who are elected are seldom regarded by voters (and
hardly ever regard themselves) as popular representatives in the way that legislators
are…” (p. 120)
Based on Waldron’s perspective, the legitimacy puzzle of judicial review is considered to
be unrepresentative and undemocratic. However, the use of judicial review is explicitly for the
purpose of defending a countries’ constitution and implicit for supporting representative
democratic governance. The same issues of legitimacy, which Waldron uses, can be applied to
representative democracy when compared to direct democracy. While both judicial review and
representative democratic institutions are pragmatic forms of governance, Kyritsis (2006) finds
that the former is:
[A] system that pits the judiciary not against the ‘collective will of the people’…but
against another institution, which, though representative of the people in a sense…is not
the same as the People. (p. 741)
While the democratic objection to judicial review illustrates the conflicts of judicial review,
similar objections can be applied to having representative democracy instead of direct
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democracy. In both situations, “someone else decide[s] what the people ought to do” instead of
the people deciding for themselves (Kyritsis, 2006, p. 742).
Constitutional integrity is the ability of courts to protect an individual’s rights. However,
the judiciary has had “…its influence on promoting progressive notions of distributive
justice…exaggerated” (Hirschl, 2004, p. 214). In a comparative sense, economic inequality and
judicial review finds a positive correlation where “[t]he United States…has a vigorous judicial
review process…[with high inequality] compared to other advanced industrial nations” (Schor,
2008, p. 272). The United States case is contrasted with Nordic countries that have low rates of
economic inequality “…while being less than enthusiastic (to put it mildly) about the American
notions of rights and judicial review” (Hirschl, 2004, p. 220).
The Nordic case is interesting because they have “…traditionally been agnostic, at best,
toward American-style high-voltage constitutionalism, rights talk, and judicial activism” while
instead relying mainly on their legislatures for judicial review (Hirschl, 2011, p. 450). Judicial
review is an institutional check against the tyranny the legislature and executive branch. If a
country’s constitution restricts representative democratic governance’s ability to impact
economic inequality, through wealth redistribution and the formation of regulations and
institutions, then judicial review will be correlated with higher rates of economic inequality.

Participation and Electoral Composition
Anderson and Beramendi (2008) explore the connection between income, whether
absolute or relative, and electoral participation. They argue that “...the notion that income and
income inequality matter to democratic processes and the quality of democratic outcomes is
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widely accepted” and further explore the challenges associated with the connection between
electoral participation and income inequality (Anderson & Beramendi, 2008, p. 278).
Furthermore, they note “[s]tudents of mass political behavior have long argued that a country’s
economic conditions affect people’s beliefs about whether government is legitimate and
effective” which leads to one’s inclination to be involved in politics and government (Anderson
& Bermendi, 2008, p. 279). As noted, issues of income inequality, political participation, and
perceptions of government legitimacy are all linked together through the research.
Anderson and Bermendi create a framework for the connection between income and
political participation (2008). They note that “...higher levels of education and social status...are
the most consistently significant predictors of political action across a variety of countries”
illustrating a connection between social standing, income levels and political participation
(Anderson & Bermendi, 2008, p. 281). The researchers find that “...the existing evidence linking
income inequality and participation at the aggregate level points to a similar direction” where
overall levels of inequality can be matched with lower levels of involvement (Anderson &
Bermendi, 2008, p. 281). The main issue, however, is that there is lack of research regarding the
“issue of causality” in the relationship between inequality and electoral participation. The
propensity for echo chambers between economic inequality and political participation make the
saliency of the two concepts difficult to decouple though a connection does exist.
Anderson and Beramendi find that “...greater inequality is indeed associated with lower
turnout at the macro level” and that countries with the higher levels of income inequality
experience the lowest electoral participation and that “countries where inequality increases over
time should experience drops in electoral participation” (2008, p. 293). They also conclude that
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in countries where there is an overall “decommodification”, where individuals rely less on the
market (due to advanced welfare states guarantee of basic material rights and other positive
freedoms), there is a higher amount of political participation because the costs of participation
are lessened and amount of income inequality damped (2008). Anderson and Beramendi’s
research points to the complex nature of income inequality and overall electoral participation and
helps to further the foundation for this research.
The demographics of an electoral body should mirror the electorate to be considered
representative of the population. This form of descriptive representation is one form of
representation used by Pitkin when conceptualizing representation (1967). Through descriptive
representation it is found that “[e]ven where representatives are chosen through fair and
democratic elections…that legislative assemblies remain ‘unrepresentative’…[t]his is especially
true of representation at the national level” (Bird, 2003, p. 2). This is a key concern for the
representation of women and ethnic minorities in society.
There has never been an ideal national legislative body that fully meets the descriptive
representative requirement. However, in many countries there has been an effort to increase
representation of women and ethnic minorities through quotas, candidate lists and other methods
to increase diversity in legislatures. Whether the use of such tools is appropriate for
representative democracies to meet the goal of descriptive representation is questioned.
Using institutional mechanisms to increase descriptive representation instead of
addressing the underlying reason for underrepresentation can be viewed as problematic. The
under-representation may be contributed “…to badly functioning democratic institutions
or…failing normative foundations of postmodern Western democracies” (Meier & Kombardo,
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2013, p. 48). Women and minorities may participate and be represented in larger numbers if any
barriers or negative mechanisms barring participation were removed. Furthermore, the use of
quotas and other mechanisms can be viewed as ‘special help’ or ‘preferential treatment’ in what
might be perceived by citizens as an already ‘fair system’ (Bacchi, 2006; Meier & Kombardo,
2013).
Currently women and ethnic minorities are marginalized in most national legislatures of
democratic industrialized countries (Bird, 2003). In majoritarian-single member districts women
members in the national legislature range from 12.1% (France 2002) to 25.3% (Australia 2001)
and for proportional representation 13.3% (Ireland 2002) to 38% (Denmark 2001 and
Netherlands 2003) of legislative seats. For ethnic minorities in majoritarian-single member
districts range from 0% of seats held compared to 8% in the national population (France 2002) to
15.7% of seats held compared to 28.1% in the national population (United States 2002) and for
proportional representation 0% seats held compared to 1-6% (Ireland 2002, Portugal 2002,
Switzerland 1999) to 8.7% seats held compared to 9% in the national population (Netherlands
2003) (Bird, 2003, Table 1).
The comparative framework for measuring and analyzing the representation of women is
straightforward but complex for ethnic minorities. Classifying data between men and women in
elections and legislatures is a simple count of votes, seats and population. Identifying and
measuring ethnic minorities can be difficult compared to gender. The saliency of comparative
representation of ethnic minorities is difficult because of the lack of ethnic minority data (like in
Belgium and France) and the differences in definitions of what constitutes an ethnic minority and
qualifies an individual as an ethnic minorities in a particular country (Bird, 2003).
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There are other major differences when comparing women and ethnic minorities within
the context of descriptive representation. Proportional representative electoral systems are more
beneficial for the descriptive representation of women compared to single-member districts as
well systems that employ close-lists candidate selection (Bird, 2003; Darcy, Welch & Clark,
1994; Meier & Lombardo, 2013). Neither proportional representation or single-member districts
has had a clear benefit for ethnic minorities due to the way in which party lists are made with
proportional representation or how districts are drawn with single member districts (Bird, 2003;
Tossutti & Najem, 2002). There are lower levels of political solidarity on issues at the national
level with the women electorate compared to ethnic minority groups (Bird, 2003). Lastly, women
make up approximately half of the population of any country while ethnic minority groups are
smaller populations that are often regionalized.

Economic Conditions
The major way in which governments have an effect on economic inequality is through
redistribution policy of wealth and income. A recent OECD report found that “[p]ublic cash
transfers, as well as income taxes and social security contributions, played a major role in all
OECD countries in reducing market-income inequality” to the extent that it reduces the Gini
coefficient by an average of one-quarter for OECD countries for the working-age population
(2011, p. 36). Governments have a direct impact on economic inequality through tax-andtransfer policies as well as through other economic regulatory institutions and social policies.
Scruggs (2008) examines historical trends in national social welfare and insurance
programs. His research argues that the level of generosity of welfare programs is structurally
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dependent, based on differences in economic growth, and is rooted in differences in taxation
systems. The research shows that there was an expansion of generosity of social programs for
redistribution in the 1970s to 1980s. Since then, for most countries, this trend has stagnated, if
not contracted. Scruggs’ research also notes that countries with more generous welfare programs
often have fiscal systems that reduce poverty and economic inequality. Countries with strong
national welfare systems also have progressive taxation systems which; such policies target
poverty and inequality.
When analyzing rates of economic inequality many pundits, politicians and academics
have pointed at the Transatlantic Consensus (Atkinson 1999). This viewpoint finds that most of
the fluctuations and trends in the growth of economic inequality are explained by the decreased
value in labor due to globalization and the economic liberalizing of developing countries. Instead
there is an overall increased value in capital (relative to labor) in developed countries. Beramendi
and Cusack question the conventional viewpoint with regard to the Transatlantic Consensus by
stating that this view “exaggerates the uniformity in trends toward inegalitarian societies” and
that the inclusion of overall market income, meaning from capital markets instead of simply
wages from labor, must be fully illustrated and considered when analyzing rates of inequality
(2008, p. 127).
Beramendi and Cusack identify a “structural dependence of the state on capital” and they
argue, “once the distribution of earnings is controlled for, [political] parties are not able to affect
the distribution of market income directly” (2008, p. 153). There is a greater need for state
involvement in capital markets to address concerns of economic inequality based on this
perspective. Governments that heavily regulate the stock market tend to lessen the ability for
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wealthy individuals to benefit in investing in capital markets. They state directly that “the scope
of the government’s control of the workings of the stock market is a political decision...thus...the
degree of stock market capitalization can be seen as a channel through which the distribution of
market income becomes politicized...in an indirect way” (Beramendi & Cusack, 2008, p. 153).
A certain level of popular support for redistribution must exist for parties and policies
that would enact progressive economic changes from tax policies to welfare strategies. Cusack,
Iversen, and Rehm argue that policy demands for economic redistribution are based at the
individual level. Individuals’ policy preferences on redistribution are “shaped by actual or
threatened unemployment” since it can reduce total income and will increase the need for
services funded by redistribution (2008, p. 203). The policy supply for economic redistribution is
based on two factors: first, salient political cleavages, which negotiate the distribution of political
risks for economic redistribution; second, how the aggregate of interests play on the institutional
dimension. The supply and demand of redistributionary policy due to unemployment is
considered as a factor in this study to be a factor within this model.

In sum, the literature establishes connections between economic inequality and
democratic representation. The literature has explored this connection on how they influence
each other based on an institutional perspective. The history and philosophy on economic
inequality and democratic representation share a common evolution in Western society. This
intertwining history begins with the Greeks and has continued to progress by the shift caused by
the Age of Enlightenment and continues until modern times. Both concepts share common
problems with meeting their ideal form. Each have their challenges whether it is expanding
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equality to larger populations or making democracy more representative. The thesis will continue
to develop on these established points where economic inequality and democratic representation
interact.
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN
This thesis proposes empirical support that economic inequality increases as democratic
institutions become less representative. This connection helps to further elaborate on
Transatlantic Consensus by including the mediating role of government in the economic
inequality equation. Higher rates of economic inequality should cause lower income individuals
to demand redistributionary policies or institutions and regulations from their democratically
elected representatives. My theoretical framework when analyzing democratic representation is
informed by an institutional perspective.
Based on the literature, I expect that more progressive forms of representative institutions
will be associated with lower levels of economic inequality. These progressive forms of
representative institutions should allow the greater citizenry an impact on decision-making by
qualifying under Pitkin’s definitions of representation (1967). Economic inequality will decrease
when representation is increased in industrialized democracies through increases in access to
representatives, increases in egalitarian political structures, decreasing power distance between
institutions and citizenry, or other structural arrangements. A novel variable used in this study is
the total number of representatives in national legislatures relative to the national population. I
establish that this variable is an important factor that has not been fully considered in
understanding the link between representation and economic inequality.
The main hypothesis in this thesis is that there is a negative relationship between the level
of institutional representation, operationalized through institutional variables, and economic
inequality in a democracy. When a country has more progressive forms of representation,
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measured through institutional factors that have a positive relationship with democratic
representation, then economic inequality decreases. In addition, I examine the effect of a dilution
of representative shares per capita using the ratio of representatives to the general population.
When there are fewer representatives then there is the possibility of less access to representatives
by the general population. If this occurs then the ability of a narrow segment of the population,
through economic and political means, can capture the interests of representatives relative to the
overall population. When this occurs economic inequality will increase as well.

Current Approach and Alternatives
Current research has found that the Transatlantic Consensus is limited (Atkinson, 1999;
Beramendi & Anderson, 2008). According to the Transatlantic Consensus, the increase of
economic inequality in Western countries within the past few decades is due to shifts in
economic composition of national economies where:
[I]ncreased wage inequality is attributed to a shift in relative demand away from
unskilled to skilled workers.” (Atkinson, 2002, p. 6)
The Transatlantic Consensus is limited as the universal explanation for what has
occurred with Western economic inequality. It is found to be too broad and over-simplified to
explain the economics shifts in economic inequality (Atkinson, 1999; 2002; Beramendi &
Anderson, 2008). This is due to multiple reasons including the lack of a universal systematic
trend in economic inequality over the past few decades, varying levels of economic inequality
episodes in different countries or regions, as well as differing levels of trade liberalism,
technological changes and pools of unskilled labor. Furthermore, a recent OECD report finds
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“…that neither rising trade integration nor financial openness had a significant impact on…wage
inequality…within the OECD countries” further supporting the limitations of the Transatlantic
Consensus (2011, p. 29). But if not the Transatlantic Consensus, then what might be a better way
to understand the economic inequality in developed countries?
Many researchers have studied the components that impact both political representation
and economic inequality when analyzing the changes in rates of economic inequality in Western
developed countries (Beramendi et al., 2008; Kriesi et al., 2008). One perspective argues that
globalization has shifted the social cleavages that form the divisions of voter blocs with
respective support for political parties (Kriesi et al., 2008). Another perspective focuses on the
causes and effects that economic inequality and representation have on each other (Beramendi &
Anderson, 2008). However, neither offers a counter explanation against argument made by the
Transatlantic Consensus.
Another perspective for the variations in cross-national economic inequality is due to
differences in societal ideology and institutional efficacy. Societal ideologies on economic
inequality differ between countries and regions. Smeeding (2004) conjectures that:
Ideology—in the sense of national understanding of the meaning of “fairness,” altruism
and basic human rights—may play a crucial independent role in defining the acceptable
domains of inequality. (p. 25)
Cultural differences on the preferred level of economic inequality are an abstract way of
considering acceptable rates of resource disparity. Even more important to consider is
institutional efficacy, or the connection between government and constituent interests. This may
help to explain regional differences in economic inequality. There will be a higher potential for
policies that combat economic inequality in governments with strong institutional efficacy.
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Smeeding (2004) states that institutional efficacy is “…crucial in understanding whether
demands are made of the political system to reach these ‘fairness’ objectives” (p. 25).
This thesis provides an alternative explanation of the growing economic inequality gap in
Western developed economies based on the decline of political representation. The study follows
that government institutions effect inequality in two ways, “[e]ither direct effects of
redistribution or via indirect effects created by institutions and regulations” (Smeeding, 2004, p.
19). Government institutions posses a toolbox of “…policy choices, regulations, and institutions
[that] can have a crucial impact” on economic inequality when mediating “…how globalization
and technological changes affect the distribution of income” (OECD, 2011, p. 26). The key
factor of institutional democratic mechanisms is used as the focus in explaining contemporary
changes in economic inequality.
A thought experiment developed by Rousseau, discussed in Chapter 2, is the starting
point for establishing a counter-Transatlantic Consensus and the novel variable of the
representative ratio. Rousseau’s main concern was in the legitimacy of democratic government
when nations grew larger. As a population grows maintaining the General Will, or the fulfillment
of the needs, wants, and/or desires of a given population, becomes more difficult. Rousseau’s
thought experiment can be applied to contemporary comparative politics when considering the
dilution of an individual’s representative shares as the population grows larger when the number
of representatives stays constant.
The concept of the General Will is often debated and criticized however the translation of
the General Will into modern democratic theory is still valid to consider within the framework of
this study. I hypothesize that if the General Will of a population is not represented through the
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mediation of government institutions that economic inequality will increase. This is one part of
how representation relates to economic inequality. The General Will, for redistributionary policy,
becomes problematic when representative shares are diluted based on the fiscal commons theory
developed by Buchannan and Tullock (1967). In their theory, taxes are broadly applied to a
population but the benefits are narrowly distributed. The fiscal commons theory becomes
relevant when considering the potential for representatives to serve the narrow interest of higher
income individuals.

Data, Hypotheses and Methods
This study uses a cross-national longitudinal model to evaluate the impact of democratic
political representation has on economic inequality at the institutional level. The data include
macroeconomic and national political factors from a 39-year time span, from 1970-2009, for 23
countries from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (not all
OECD countries are included). Most countries in the study are Western European countries
(except for Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the United States). Only data from
periods of democratic governance are included in the dataset (excluded are Greece until 1974,
Portugal until 1975 and Spain until 1977). These countries were selected due to their status as
developed democracies and their variation in rates of economic inequality and institutional
composition. The comparative macro-data was readily available through many sources discussed
in the Appendix.
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This model examines and evaluates the impact that levels of democratic representation
have on economic inequality. Measures of economic inequality are diverse and varied; here this
study measures income inequality using the Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient is a statistical
measurement of statistical dispersion where a coefficient of zero represents perfect equality
among the entire population and a coefficient of one represents all the resources are held by one
individual (Solt, 2009).
The quantitative model in this paper uses the Standardized World Income Inequality
Database (SWIID) to “...meet the needs of…cross-national research...maximizing the
comparability of income inequality data while maintaining the widest possible coverage across
countries over time” (Solt, 2009, p. 234). Income inequality, as represented by the net and gross
Gini coefficient, is both the most readily available and standardized measure of economic
inequality. I use both forms of the Gini coefficient to consider rates of economic inequality at a
pre-tax and post-tax period. I use gross (market) and net income inequality to allow for the
measurement of income inequality before and after government redistribution.
This study uses an institutional approach to comparative democratic theory. This
approach follows that ‘institutions do matter’ in measuring the level of representation in a
national legislatures. The model uses a novel variable of the representative ratio, where the
population is divided by the number of representatives at the national legislature 1. The
representative ratio is different than district magnitude but somewhat similar to district size.

1

In bicameral systems, the number of representatives is only for the lower house.
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District magnitude is the total number of candidates from any particular district (Chang &
Golden, 2007). For instance, district magnitude would be the total number of representatives
from any particular state or district. District size, on the other hand, is the “…mean population in
a legislative district for a state” (Bailey & Hickman, 20055). The population is divided by the
number of representatives for any particular district or state to find the district size. This is
similar to the representative ratio, however the latter is not district based but instead a national
measurement. The representative ratio uses the entire country as one unit of analysis even though
differences of district size exist within countries. The use of district size would be applicable to a
state-by-state comparison. I use the representative ratio for the purposes of a cross-national
comparison of the effects of different national legislature sizes relative to the size of the national
population.
I use additional variables to reflect institutional factors: the effective number of parties,
an indexing of institutional constraints on central state government (including European Union
membership, federalism, and bicameralism), the presence of a presidential system, the use of
single-member districts and the presence of judicial review. The control variables used are voter
turnout, seats held by women in parliamentary, gross domestic product per capita,
unemployment and the percentage of civilian employment in the industrial sector.

Institutional Factors
The institutional factors in the model illustrate a country’s level of democratic
representation. The novel variable used, the representative ratio, is a measure of the national
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population divided by the number of representatives in the national legislature 2. When the ratio
is higher, it is assumed that the citizenry’s democratic representation decreases and individual
shares in their representative are diluted, as representatives are responsible for a larger
constituency. When this occurs then economic inequality should increase ceteris paribus. This is
possibly due many factors including increased right-wing partisan bias of representatives in the
case of majoritarian systems (Gilligan & Matsusaka, 2001), overall decreased public spending
(Gilligan & Matsusaka, 1999), less political representative access for lower classes (Smeeding,
2004), and spending benefiting a narrower segment of the population to limited access
(Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). This study expects to find that economic inequality will be
increased because of a higher ratio of representatives to the overall populations. It is expected
that this occurs because as the ratio increases, the representative begins to represent the interests
of individuals with the means to support the representative, through financial contributions,
political endorsements, and overall mobilization efforts.
For other institutional factors which impact the electoral system, the study uses Laakso
and Taagepera’s effective number of parties in parliament (1979). This variable illustrates the
level of party fractionalization in a political system. An increase in effective parties is assumed to
increase representation of different interests and allow more choice for the electorate. A lower
effective number of parties are assumed to reflect less representation of interests and give the
electorate less choice. However, the increase of fragmented government due to excessive parties
does have the potential of causing less effective government and decreased ability to pass laws

2

In bicameral systems, the number of representatives is only for the lower house.
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and reforms. I expect a negative correlation between effective number of parties and economic
inequality based on these assumptions.
For institutional factors that indicate structural or constitutional composition, the study
uses Schmidt’s index of institutional constraints of central state government (1996), which
indexes European Union membership, federalism, difficulty of constitutional amendments, level
of bicameralism, referendum frequency as well as Beyler’s level of central bank autonomy
(2007). A country with higher restraints on a government’s ability to create and execute power is
assumed to make it less effective and less able to carryout the desires of their constituents. This
index is used to illustrate when legislatures have to compete with other formal institutions, such
as the EU, autonomous central banks, state governments, or informal institutions, such as citizen
referendums, ability to change the constitution, and an overall diffusion of power.
Additional structural factors used are Huber et al.’s coding for single-member districts,
presidential systems, and judicial review (2004). Single-member districts tend to result in mostly
center-right governments while systems that use proportional representation tend to elect centerleft governments (Iversen & Soskice, 2008). Center-left governments will be more likely to
redistribute wealth and will create institutions and regulations that are intended to lower
economic inequality. Single-member districts should have a positive correlation with economic
inequality due to the tendency of this system to result in center-right governments.
Both presidential systems and constitutions with judicial review are institutions that are
viewed as a balance of power against national legislatures. Governments that have a presidential
system have an executive branch, which is separate from the legislature, and are democratically
elected through a separate vote. The impact that presidential systems have on economic
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inequality will be supporting policies closer to the median voter compared to the legislature
(Matsuasaka, 2007). The median voter is assumed to seek policies that decrease economic
inequality; however, the importance of economic inequality to voters may vary.
Judicial review is considered to be unrepresentative and undemocratic compared to the
executive and legislative branch. However, the ability for national courts to review laws is
considered a way to protect individual rights and national constitutions from other institutions.
Countries that have judicial review will limit the ability for other democratically elected
branches to act in an unrestrained and unconstitutional manner. I expect that countries with
judicial review will have a positive effect on economic inequality.

Other Controls Variables
The study includes additional variables that are found in the literature to have an impact
on national economic inequality. These control variables will also help to explain economic
conditions. Voter turnout is included as a proxy for the level of civic participation in electoral
activities. More active populations in electoral activities mean a higher the amount of
representation of the population in a democratic system ceteris paribus. Voter turnout has a
strong connection with an individual’s level of income where higher income results in a higher
likelihood of participation in elections (Anderson & Beramendi, 2008). Lower voter turnout will
indicate higher economic inequality as a larger portion of the lower income population is not
invested in the political system.
The percentage of women representatives holding seats in the national legislature will
illustrate how descriptively representative the national legislature is to the population and
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indicate a proxy level of gender equality in a given society. Women generally make less than
their male counterparts even though they represent approximately half of the population of any
country (Duflo, 2012; Ferrant, 2014). There will be higher overall economic inequality for the
larger population with a higher level of gendered-economic inequality. A greater focus on
women’s political and economic inequality on the national agenda is expected when women
participate by holding seats in the national legislature. Legislatures with a higher number of
women seated should have lower rates of economic inequality compared to societies with less
women representatives.
The study applies macroeconomic data to control for key variables that are likely to affect
the national economic structure and therefore economic inequality. Gross domestic product per
capita and national civilian unemployment are used as two important macroeconomic control
variables. The use of gross domestic product per capita is used to describe an approximation of
average individual wealth though it is not indicative of any particular level of economic
inequality. The unemployment rate should logically follow that when a larger portion of the
population is unemployed then economic inequality will be higher. When individuals are out of
work they begin to rely on social safety nets and their income levels, even with support, will be
much lower.
The model also includes the civilian labor force involved in the industrial sector as a
percentage of the total population. The use of the size of the workforce employed in industrial
labor is key for a couple reasons. First, using industrial labor is a way to control for the
Transatlantic Consensus’ explanation of economic inequality where economic shifts in
exogenous factors from globalization are attributed to increased economic inequality in
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developed countries. Second, it serves as a proxy for unionization data. As the percentage of
labor involved in industrial sectors decreases, with other factors held constant, economic
inequality should increase. Institutions with higher levels of democratic representation but a
constant level of the industrial sector will find a decrease in economic inequality due to higher
redistribution of wealth, policies that support job training, increased regulation of trade and fair
trade requirements.

Quantitative Model
This study hypothesized that more representative institutions will be associated with
lower levels of economic inequality. Furthermore, this study tests for a novel variable, the
representative ratio, where the larger number of representatives at the national legislature relative
to the civilian population will result in lower economic inequality. Variables that represent more
progressive representation are expected to keep a negative relationship with economic inequality,
meaning less economic inequality. The use of gross and net income inequality is intended to
illustrate income inequality at a pre-tax and post-tax period. This allows for applying the
quantitative model to income inequality before and after government redistribution. Thus the
study assumes that the general population will prefer more economic egalitarianism to higher
economic inequality.
The equations used for the model is as follows:
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟, 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝,
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠, 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑,
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟, 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡, 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝,
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙)
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(1)

𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 t𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟,
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐t𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟, 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡, 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝,
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙)
(2)

𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟, 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝,
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐t𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠, 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟,
𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡, 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝, 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙)
(3)

𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟,
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐t𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝a𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟, 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡, 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝,
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙)
(4)
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Introduction
The study uses a quantitative model that applies panel data (longitudinal or crosssectional time-series data) xt model to estimate the effects that varying levels of representation
and institutional variables have on economic inequality. The study hypothesizes that progressive
representation in the form of increased representation of the civic population will lead to
decreased economic inequality. The Gini coefficient is used as the dependent variable both
expressed as the post-tax “net” and pre-tax “gross” version of income inequality. A two-year lag
of the Gini coefficient is used as well to indicate what effects may follow changes in the electoral
makeup or other societal composition. I use the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) model to account for
the presence of heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional dependence. 3

Results
The representative ratio, the novel variable of the study, is found to be statistically
significant at the 1-percent level for all four modeled versions of economic inequality (Gini net
and gross as well as the standard versus two-year lag). When individuals’ share of representation
by a legislator is diluted then democratic representation is decreased. The higher the ratio,
meaning the higher number of individuals each legislative represents, the higher economic
inequality. This is consistent with the hypothesis of the study.

3

A detailed explanation of the functional form of the model is included in the APPENDIX A section.
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Laakso and Taagepera’s effective number of parties based on seats in the legislature
(1979) was found to have a positive and statistically significant effect on economic inequality for
all four modeled version of economic inequality. As party fractionalization increases in an
electoral system there is evidence that economic inequality increases as well. This is counter to
the study’s original assumption where the increase of party choices would mean increased
representation and thus decreased economic inequality. I attribute this to an excessive amount of
party fractionalization in government, which can lead to ineffective government.
Presidential systems and single-member districts are shown to have a negative impact on
economic inequality and is statistically significant for all four modeled versions of economic
inequality except for single member districts when the dependent variable is a two-year lagged
measure of gross inequality. The result on the presidential system supports the study’s original
assumption that presidential systems be associated with lower economic inequality. However,
the result for the single-member district is counter to the study’s original assumption of a
positive correlation with economic inequality. This provides a quandary to the previously
established literature that would suggest different results.
Judicial review is shown to have positive effects on economic inequality although the
statistical significance is weak if not non-existent for the net Gini coefficient but has a stronger
statistical significance for gross Gini coefficient, meaning a weaker positive pre-tax effect versus
a stronger post-tax effect. This positive effect follows the original assumption of the study. The
institutional constraints index was shown to not have a statistically significant effect on
economic inequality although the coefficients were positive. The positive coefficients are
consistent with the study’s original logic.
57

The other non-institutional variables show mixed results and impacts to economic
inequality. Voter turnout is shown to not be statistically significant to economic inequality and
had mixed results. The percentage of women holding seats in the national legislature is shown to
have a positive effect on economic inequality though only statistically significant for both net
and gross Gini coefficients when the dependent variable is lagged at the two-year interval. This
result is not consistent with the original assumption of the study.
Gross domestic product per capita is found to have a negative statistically significant
effect only on the net Gini coefficient. I use this factor as a control variable without any
assumption as to its effect on economic inequality. The percentage of the labor force employed
in the industrial sector is found to have a negative statistically significant effect only on the gross
Gini coefficient. This result is consistent with the study’s original assumption with regard to
economic inequality and industrial labor. The unemployment rate, however, does not have a
statistically significant result. The quantitative model accounts for 26.70-34.15% of variation in
income inequality using four different dependent variables.
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Table 1 – Effects of Democratic Representation on Economic Inequality
OECD countries, 1970-2009, N = 834.
(1) Gini Net

(2) Gini Net
(2-year lag)

(3) Gini Gross (4) Gini Gross
(2-year lag)

Representative Ratio 0.0000288
(0.0001)***

0.0000308
(0.0001)***

0.0000205
(0.0001)***

0.000023
(0.0001)***

Effective Parties
0.4110
Legislature Seats (0.1019)***

0.3713
(0.1135)***

0.0373
(0.1660)**

0.5184
(0.2546)**

Institutional
0.2816
Constraints Index (0.2896)

0.2827
(0.2728)

0.1049
(0.6794)

0.0615
(0.6353)

Presidential System

-2.5878
(0.4880)***

-2.2892
(0.6305)***

-6.1980
(1.1285)***

-6.0849
(1.2606)***

Single Member
District

-1.7152
(0.5519)***

-2.0321
(0.5017)***

-1.4355
(0.7616)*

-1.3496
(0.8111)

Judicial Review

0.9305
(0.5519)*

0.8151
(0.5342)

4.5500
(1.4330)***

3.6549
(1.5324)**

Voter Turnout (%)

0.0049
(0.0331)

0.0182
(0.0363)

-0.0356
(0.0425)

0.0040
(0.0477)

Women in Leg. (%)

0.0149
(0.0246)

0.0182
(0.0205)*

0.0549
(0.0470)

0.1050
(0.0353)***

GDP Per Capita

-0.0012
(0.0003)***

-0.0006
(0.0003)*

-0.0003
(0.0005)

-0.0002
(0.0006)

Unemployment
Rate (%)

-0.0624
(0.0494)

-0.0557
(0.0437)

-0.0822
(0.1128)

-0.1436
(0.1182)

Industrial Sector (%) -5.6874
(5.1059)

-2.3251
(4.5056)

-24.6199
(6.0121)***

-18.4920
(5.415)***

Wald Chi-square
Prob
N
R2

0.000
795
0.2670

0.000
834
0.3415

0.000
795
0.3155

0.000
834
0.2711

Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses. Data sources in APPENDIX C.
* Significant at the 10-percent level
** Significant at the 5-percent level.
***Significant at the 1-percent level
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Discussion
Expected Results
This study confirms the positive effect of the representative ratio on income inequality.
Income inequality increases as the number of citizens that each representative in the national
legislature represents increases. This is supported both with the net Gini coefficient and the gross
Gini coefficient (meaning both pre and post-tax policy effects). The results follow the logic of
the study and support the overall hypothesis that as a representative’s share of the population
inflates then representation is diluted and income inequality increases.
The effects of presidential systems, judicial review and industrial percentage of the labor
market are consistent with my expectations. The negative effect that presidential systems have on
economic inequality is consistent with the original hypothesis. The results show a higher degree
of impact on income inequality with pre-tax income inequality compared to post-tax net income
inequality. The executive’s larger impact on the control of regulation and economic institutions
compared to its effect on wealth distribution may explain this. Are presidential systems more
representative than their parliamentarian systems? It is of the opinion of this study that
presidential systems serve as a representative check against the legislature but are not necessarily
more representative than non-presidential systems. However, presidential systems are thought to
have an executive that is representative of the median voter; this supports the idea that median
voters generally support policies which lead to less economic inequality.
Judicial review is positively related to income inequality. While judicial review can lead
to decisions that help or hurt income inequality, generally speaking, the judicial review process
occurs outside of a traditionally representative system. The effect of judicial review is only
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statistically significant for gross income inequality and this may be similar to the results for the
presidential system. The courts may play a role in income inequality with regard to issues of
institutions and regulation and not necessarily on redistribution.
The percentage of the civilian population involved in the industrial sector follows the
Transatlantic Consensus where systematic trends away from industrial sectors has lead to the
growth of economic inequality. This is only true for gross income inequality, which is pre-taxand-government distribution. The industrial sector factor loses its statistical significance with net
income inequality. After government redistribution, industrial labor no longer has the same effect
on income inequality. This result supports the argument that the Transatlantic Consensus is
accurate but only to a point. This study makes and supports the case that the response of
democratic institutions is an important factor instead of solely shifts in industrial labor and
globalization as explained by the Transatlantic Consensus.

Contrary to Expectations
The effective number of parties in parliament, single-member districts, and the
percentage of women in the legislature yield statistically significant results that are contrary to
expectations. The effective number of parties was originally thought to have a negative
relationship with economic inequality. As the amount of choices and options for parties increase,
there would be more options and representation of the population policy and agenda preferences.
However, this may be explained as a result of party fractionalization as well as marginalization
of leftist parties in coalitions. Too many parties and choices may lead to ineffective coalitions,
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coalition building that trades ideal policy for pragmatic agendas, or the possible structural
marginalization of parties which advocate reducing economic inequality.
The negative effect that single-member districts have on income inequality does not
support the original hypothesis. Are single member districts more representative than
proportional representative systems? Single member districts are generally considered less
representative than proportional representative systems (Lijphart, 1995). This is because each
single member district is thought to only represent the winning interests’ side while the
population that does not endorse their representative normally does not have their issues fully
represented at the national level. The results of this study find that single-member districts have a
negative effect on income inequality.
The number of women in the legislature is found to be positively related to income
inequality but only on the two-year lagged period. This is counter to my expectation of
descriptive representation through gender politics. The number of women in the legislature
represents cultural gender egalitarianism where increased gender egalitarianism would mean less
income inequality. Based on the results of the study, there is evidence to support that the number
of women in the legislature does not necessarily mean that there will be less income inequity.
The literature suggests that this is due to less political unity among women on the issue of
economics and party list selection methods (Bird, 2003). This variable being statistically
significant only in the two-year lagged period may indicate that women legislatures do not help
income inequality in the short-term. However, a longer lag period may have produced different
results.
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The results of the study support the original hypothesis and also bring up some valid
questions in the way some of the factors have been interpreted in the literature. While the
representative ratio, presidential system, judicial review, and industrialization sector all support
the original hypothesis, the effective number of parties, single-member districts, and number of
women in the legislature do not. Whether increased party fractionalization or single-member
districts are more representative than their alternative can be debated. However, the requirement
for descriptive representation with more women in the legislature not leading to less income
inequality is confounding.
The institutional constraints index is found to not be statically significant. This variable is
inclusive of European Union membership, federalism, difficulty of constitutional amendments,
the level of bicameralism, referendum frequency, and central bank autonomy. All of these factors
were originally considered to be constraints on the ability of effective governance. There were no
statistically significant results for institutional constraints as it relates to income inequality.
Separating these indexed factors into individual variables may have yielded a more precise and
logical result.
Voter turnout not being statistically significant with regard to income inequality is
surprising given arguments about the importance of civic participation and class based political
participation. Variations in voter turnout are not too different for a majority of the countries (with
a mean of 77.66 percent and a 50 percentile at 80.3 percent) and the lack of variation in the
variable in-between the election may be relevant to why voter turnout did not yield statistically
significant results.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
Economic inequality has a negative impact on society. High rates of economic inequality
is a situation that policymakers should want to avoid from affecting economic growth, straining
government budgets, to creating societal disharmony and fractionalization based on class lines.
However, variations in economic inequality are still a question that many research and debate.
From the perspective of the Transatlantic Consensus, many view economic inequality in
developed nations as simply a side effect of globalization. This study argues and supports that
the Transatlantic Consensus does not go far enough in explaining the factors that contribute to
economic inequality.
Based on the results of this study, there is evidence that support the perspective that
representative forms of democratic institutions have an impact on income inequality.
Furthermore, the ratio of representatives compared to the overall population is shown to have a
positive statistically significant effect on income inequality. The Transatlantic Consensus,
represented by the industrial sector’s composition of the economy, is found to have a negative
statically significant effect on income inequality only when looking at the gross pre-tax Gini
coefficient model. Thus, the results of this model find that the Transatlantic Consensus is limited
in its explanation of economic inequality and that political institutions’ impact should be
considered.
This study supports that representation, through democratic institutions, regulates
economic inequality through redistribution and structural policy. Using this theoretical
perspective, the study uses the composition of democratic government to seek out any factors
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that connect economic inequality to democratic institutions or institutional structures. The
hypothesis follows that democratic institutions that are more representative of their constituents
will lead to lower rates of economic inequality.
The result of the quantitative model used finds some variation in the results, some of
which support the overall hypothesis. However, it does find that the Transatlantic Consensus
does not go far enough in explaining economic inequality in developed nations. With statistically
significant results for the representative ratio, the presence of judicial review, presidential
systems, effective parties, single member districts, and women in the legislature, this study
confirms that there is more to the puzzle of current rates of economic inequality in the developed
world other than just economic shifts due to globalization.

Larger Scope of the Results
The original question, which lead to this study, was whether an increasing population
with a constant number of seats in the legislature would lead to less representation. As it stands,
the United States has the highest rate of economic inequality and the highest ratio between
national representatives and the general population. Are high economic inequality rates, or the
impact other societal factors, enough of a reason to ask to increase the number of
representatives?
For the past century the House of Representatives has maintained 435 members. Would
increasing the number of legislatures to 547 members, what is advocated by the Wyoming Rule
(a leading alternative), mean that economic inequality would be reduced? Based on this study,
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there is evidence to support that a change of the United States representative ratio from 704,957
citizens to 560,614 citizens per representative in 2009 (still drastically higher than all of the
countries used) would decrease economic inequality, ceteris paribus, by approximately 2.9 with
a 32.84 net Gini coefficient to 4.5 with a 41.07 gross Gini coefficient.

Limitations and Future Research
This study offered support to an alternative explanation to the Transatlantic Consensus.
There is the possibility for much more research and alternative explanations on this topic.
Economic inequality, more specifically income inequality, is used as the dependent variable but
other measures of economic inequality could be used as well as other social well-being
indicators. Additional independent variables could be implemented to either support the current
hypothesis of this study or offer another perspective on the same research design. Furthermore,
analyzing representation institutions with different populations, such as sub-national
governments, could lend another scope in which to view the question of different economic
inequality rates. Lastly, using qualitative models to study case studies of newly autonomous
states may offer additional clue about how representative institutions impact economic inequality
and other social well-being indicators.
This study focused on economic inequality through the proxy variable of income
inequality. I measured income inequality using the pre-and-post-tax measures of the Gini
coefficient. Other measures of income inequality which could be used include the 20/20 ratio, the
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Palma ratio and the Theil Index. Alternative measures of inequality would help to empirically
identify if results were consistent or varied with different dependent variables.
Other studies could use the level of government taxes, benefits, government regulation or
other institutions (such as minimum wages, labor conditions, etc.) as the dependent variable
instead of income inequality. Additional forms of economic inequality can be measured through
wealth inequality, education inequality, gender inequality, and wealth concentration. Studying a
different form of the dependent variable will help to support whether the impact of government
on inequality remains salient across different measurements or factors.
The study uses standard structural factors that are studied in comparative politics from an
institutional approach. Other independent variables may help to add additional layers of
explanation to new research. Factors such as ethnic fractionalization, trade flows due to
globalization, the level of corruption, rates of unionization, and other relevant variables may help
to explain the differences between the Transatlantic Consensus and this studies explanation of
economic inequality. Furthermore, the use of the institutional constraints index separated into its
separate parts (European Union membership, federalism, difficulty of constitutional
amendments, level of bicameralism, referendum frequency, central bank autonomy) may help to
understand each component’s relationship to economic inequality.
This study used national macro-data that has the potential of over-generalizing the
dynamics of economic inequality and representative institutions. Using sub-national
governments and their district size would help to develop this study further. A cross-sub-national
government study using district size instead of the representative ratio would maintain some
similarities with regard to culture, national policies, and other factors but still offer variability in
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economic inequality and the independent variables used. Applying this version of the study to
multiple countries would be relevant in finding consistency the results of this study.
Lastly, this study’s research design was based on a quantitative model in investigating
economic inequality from the perspective of democratic representation with regard to electoral
institutions. The use of a qualitative study may lend itself to gain a deeper understanding of the
mechanisms at hand through the use of various case studies that illustrate changes. Researching
case studies of different situations would help to explore the dynamics of economic inequality
and institutional mechanisms. Examples that could be used include Switzerland’s federal system
and culturally diverse canons, Germany’s post-Cold War unification, the United Kingdom’s
differing levels of sub-national autonomy, or the United States’ state-by-state study.
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APPENDIX A: FUNCTIONAL FORM OF THE MODEL
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First, the form of the model’s regression analysis is established, that is whether to use a
fixed effects or random effects model when analyzing the panel data. In the literature, the fixed
effects xt model is considered the best method for running large panel data, in our case 23
countries for 39 years with 11 independent variables (Beck & Katz, 1995; Clark & Linzer, 2012;
Wilson & Butler, 2004). The fixed effects model is better suited for large data sets and often
gives unbiased estimates of the coefficients. However, this method may often subject to higher
sample-to-sample variability (opposed to the random effects method).
After applying the fixed effects model to the data, the Hausman test confirms that the
fixed effects model is indeed the best method. The Hausman test describes, “…how significantly
parameter estimates differ between” fixed effects and random effects (Clark & Linzer, 2012, p.
2). With a chi2 of -7772.83, the test fails to meet the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman test
and thus I reject the null hypothesis where the error term is correlated with the regressors. With
this rejection, I further support the use of fixed effects over random effects model (Clark &
Linzer, 2012).
The modified Wald test is then used to find if heteroskedasticity, where the variance of
error terms differs across units, is present in the model (Baum, 2001). The study finds that the
fixed effect regression model does indeed have heteroskedasticity in the model. Through the
modified Wald test, the fixed effects model rejects the null of homoskedasticity, or a constant
variance, in the variables (Baum, 2001; Greene, 2000). Due to the presence of heteroskedasticity,
the regression is ran as fixed-effects robust to account for the heteroskedasticity.
The final test of the data and model is to identify if there is cross-sectional dependence
present with the dataset. For large panel data “…assuming that the disturbances…are cross70

sectionally independent is…inappropriate” (Hoechle, 2007, p. 282). Though the data used in this
study all come from different countries, there is still the possibility for cross-sectional
dependence where there are “…indicat[ions] that…panel datasets are likely to exhibit complex
patterns of mutual dependence between cross-sectional units (e.g., individuals or firms” due to
“…social norms and psychological behavior patterns…as unobservable common factors [and]
complex forms of spatial and temporal dependence may even arise when the cross-sectional units
have been randomly and independently sampled” (Hoechle, 2007, p. 282). The Pesaran CD
(cross-sectional dependence) test is applied to find whether the data’s residuals are correlated
across panel sections. With a null result of zero, I can support that cross-sectional dependence
does exist in the model.
The model then is found to be optimal as a fixed effects regression but due to
heteroskedasticity a robust form must be applied. However, with cross-sectional dependence
evident, the final version of the regression must be more elaborate to account for both
heteroskedasticity and the cross-sectional dependence. Hoechle suggests the Driscoll and Kraay
model (1998) that is a “…nonparametric covariance matrix estimator that produces
heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors that are robust to general forms
of spatial and temporal dependence” (Hoechle, 2007, p. 282).
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APPENDIX B: LIST OF COUNTRIES AND YEARS ANALYZED
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Australia, 1970 - 2009
Austria, 1970 - 2009
Belgium, 1970 - 2009
Canada, 1970 - 2009
Denmark, 1970 - 2009
Finland, 1970 - 2009
France, 1970 - 2009
Germany, 1970 – 2009 4
Greece, 1974 - 2009
Iceland, 1970 - 2009
Ireland, 1970 - 2009
Italy, 1970 - 2009
Japan, 1970 - 2009
Luxembourg, 1970 - 2009
Netherlands, 1970 - 2009
New Zealand, 1970 - 2009
Norway, 1970 -2009
Portugal, 1975 - 2009
Spain, 1977 - 2009
Sweden, 1970 - 2009
Switzerland, 1970 - 2009
United Kingdom, 1970 - 2009
United State of America, 1970 – 2009

4 Data until the end of 1990 are for the Federal Republic of Germany prior to reunification only. From 1991 onwards
is all of Germany.
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APPENDIX C: DATA SOURCES, CODING AND EXPLANATION

74

Effective parties legislature seats – number of effective parties in government based on the seats
held in the national assembly according to Laakso and Taagepera (1979). Source:
calculations by Armingeon et al. (2012).
Gross domestic product per capita – national gross domestic product divided by the national
population. Source: UNdata.
Gross Gini coefficient – pre-tax-and-transfer income distribution across a country’s population
measured from 0 to 100. A higher number indicates higher income inequality. Source:
Solt (2009).
Industrial sector –size of the industrial sector of the economy as a percentage of total civilian
employment, calculated by civilian employment in industry (in thousands) divided by
civilian employment (in thousands). Source: OECD (2010) via Armingeon et al. (2012) 5
Institutional constraints index – institutional constraints on central state government. High values
indicate larger constraints on central state governments. Composed of the sum of six
dummy variables: European Union membership, degree of centralization of state
structure or federalism, difficulty of amending constitutions, strong bicameralism, central
bank autonomy, frequent referenda. Source: Beyeler (2007) and Schmidt (1996) via
Armingeon et al. (2012).
Judicial review – dummy variable indicating the absence of judicial review (0) or presence of
judicial review (1). Source: Huber et al. (2004) via Armingeon et al. (2012).
Net Gini coefficient – post-tax-and-transfer income distribution across a country’s population
measured from 0 to 100. A higher number indicates higher income inequality. Source:
Solt (2009).
Presidential system – dummy variable indicating parliamentary system (0) or
presidential/collegial executive (1). Source: Huber et al. (2004) via Armingeon et al.
(2012).
Representative ratio – country’s national population divided by the number of seats in the
national legislature 6. Source: national population from OECD (2012) via Armingeon et
al. (2012); number of legislative seats from Gallagher (2014).

5
6

Belgium 1999-2009 based on Armingeon et al. (2012) estimated values.
Data is taken for the lower house in bicameral systems.

75

Single member district – scaled dummy variable indicating proportional representation (0),
modified proportional representation (1), or single-member, simple plurality system (2).
Source: Huber et al. (2004) via Armingeon et al. (2012).
Voter turnout – percentage of voter turnout in election. Source: compiled by Armingeon et al.
(2012).
Women in legislature – percentage of women in national legislatures 7. Source: InterParliamentary Union (1995); Inter-Parliamentary Union (1997); compiled by Armingeon
et al. (2012).
Unemployment rate – national unemployment rate as a percentage of total civilan labor force.
Source: OECD (2010) via Armingeon et al. (2012) 8

7
8

Data is taken for the lower house in bicameral systems.
Belgium 1999-2009 based on Armingeon et al. (2012) estimated values.
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